Following yesterday's discouraging report, Buell further explains the futility of his infantry's pursuing Bragg's wagons and cavalry. His army has covered more territory on foot than any comparable force, having marched from Nashville to Louisville and now as far as Mount Vernon, Kentucky, covering nearly 300 miles in about one month. (Keep in mind that his army had been scattered from Nashville to Florence, Alabama when the orders to move to Kentucky were issued.) He plans to return to Nashville and then proposes taking east Tennessee with a reinforced version of the same army he withdrew through Nashville, leaving the rest to guard Kentucky under the command of General Wright.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0621
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Camp near Mount Vernon, Ky., October 17, 1862.
(Received October 19.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
My advance has continued to follow up the retreat of the enemy, but the progress has been slow, owing more to the obstructions places in the road yesterday and to-day by felling tress than to the opposition, though more or less skirmishing has been kept up. The absence of forage has compelled me to keep back the greater part of the cavalry and artillery and depend mainly on infantry. It is possible that we may be able to strike the enemy's trains and rear guard coming in on the Richmond road, but not much more, and if he gets beyond London without that it will be useless to continue the pursuit; and, as I advised you last night, I shall direct my main force by the most direct route upon Nashville, where its presence will certainly be required, whether for offensive or defensive objects. I propose to take the old divisions which I brought out of Tennessee, to each brigade of which I have added a new regiment, and one other (Sheridan's), composed about two-thirds of new regiments. Kentucky should not, under the present condition of things, be left with less than 30,000 men to guard communications and repel raids. I propose for the present to place one brigade at Lebanon, one at Munfordville, one division at Bowling Green, besides the necessary bridge guards at various points. General Wright has, I believe, moved one division to Lexington. That force should be kept there, or, better still - as long as the roads are in condition so that it can be supplied - should be thrown forward to London. There should be two regiments of cavalry at Lexington, two at Bowling Green, and two at Lebanon. They should be employed actively against guerrilla bands and concentrate rapidly against more formidable cavalry raids. There can, however, be no perfect security for Kentucky until East Tennessee is occupied. There has been no time hitherto when that could be done with any prospect of permanency. With the force that was available we should have marched into the very heart of the enemy's resources and away from our own, just as Bragg did in invading Kentucky, and with any means that we have hitherto had the result must have been similar. The enemy will regard the invasion of East Tennessee as the most dangerous blow at the rebellion, and will, it seems to me, turn his greatest efforts against it, limiting his operations in Virginia if necessary to the defense of Richmond. From this our estimate can be formed of the force with which it should be undertaken or at least followed up.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
This blog chronicles the life of the 17th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry in the American Civil War on the 150th aniversary of their service. Follow these volunteers through several major battles while experiencing both the pace and duration of the conflict. The posts may be read chronologically by accessing the archives and selecting them individually, beginning with the Preface.
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
Buell's Eye View
On this, the 16th day of October, 1862, Buell sends the following assessment of his army's predicament to General Halleck in Washington. The normally clear headed general seems to be rambling a bit, probably showing the effects of exhaustion. If Halleck was looking for a sign that General Buell needed to be replaced, this letter certainly provided it. His claim that his entire army, including new recruits, defeated Bragg when only McCook's Corps was seriously engaged is either misleading or it reflects a profound misunderstanding of the events at Perryville.
The other possibility is that this attribution reflects the old school general's approach to battle, simply moving units around on a map until the enemy decides to leave. This was a lesson taught by Halleck himself and demonstrated at Corinth. That performance had earned Halleck a promotion only four months earlier, but such results were no longer acceptable in the ever-changing landscape of the Civil War. The need was growing for generals that could find, attack and capture or kill the enemy. It had become clear that the highly organized and methodical Buell did not meet these job requirements.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0619
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
October 16, 1862. (Received October 17.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
You are aware that between Crab Orchard and Cumberland Gap the country is almost a desert. The limited supply of forage which the country affords is consumed by the enemy as he passes. In the day and a half that we have been in this sterile region our animals have suffered exceedingly. The enemy has been driven into the heart of this desert and must go on, for he cannot exist in it. For the same reason we cannot pursue in it with any hope of overtaking him, for while he is moving back on his supplies and as he goes consuming what the country affords we must bring ours forward. There is but one road and that a bad one. The route abounds in difficult defiles, in which a small force can retard the progress of a large one for a considerable time, and in that time the enemy could gain material advantage in a move upon other points. For these reasons, which I do not think it necessary to elaborate, I deem it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit, but propose to direct he main force under my command rapidly upon Nashville, which General Negley reported to me as already being invested by a considerable force and toward which I have no doubt Bragg will move the main part of his army. The railroads are being rapidly repaired and will soon be available for our supplies. In the mean time I shall throw myself on my wagon transportation, which, fortunately, is ample. While I shall proceed with these dispositions, deeming them to be proper for the public interest, it is but meet that I should say that the present time is perhaps as convenient as any for making any changes that may be thought proper in the command of this army. It has not accomplished all that I had hoped or all that faction might demand; yet, composed as it is, one-half of perfectly new troops, it has defeated a powerful and thoroughly disciplined army in one battle and has driven it away baffled and dispirited at least, and as much demoralized as an army can be under such discipline as Bragg maintains over all troops that he commands. I will telegraph you more in detail in regard to the disposition of troops in Kentucky and other matters to-morrow.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
The other possibility is that this attribution reflects the old school general's approach to battle, simply moving units around on a map until the enemy decides to leave. This was a lesson taught by Halleck himself and demonstrated at Corinth. That performance had earned Halleck a promotion only four months earlier, but such results were no longer acceptable in the ever-changing landscape of the Civil War. The need was growing for generals that could find, attack and capture or kill the enemy. It had become clear that the highly organized and methodical Buell did not meet these job requirements.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0619
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
October 16, 1862. (Received October 17.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
You are aware that between Crab Orchard and Cumberland Gap the country is almost a desert. The limited supply of forage which the country affords is consumed by the enemy as he passes. In the day and a half that we have been in this sterile region our animals have suffered exceedingly. The enemy has been driven into the heart of this desert and must go on, for he cannot exist in it. For the same reason we cannot pursue in it with any hope of overtaking him, for while he is moving back on his supplies and as he goes consuming what the country affords we must bring ours forward. There is but one road and that a bad one. The route abounds in difficult defiles, in which a small force can retard the progress of a large one for a considerable time, and in that time the enemy could gain material advantage in a move upon other points. For these reasons, which I do not think it necessary to elaborate, I deem it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit, but propose to direct he main force under my command rapidly upon Nashville, which General Negley reported to me as already being invested by a considerable force and toward which I have no doubt Bragg will move the main part of his army. The railroads are being rapidly repaired and will soon be available for our supplies. In the mean time I shall throw myself on my wagon transportation, which, fortunately, is ample. While I shall proceed with these dispositions, deeming them to be proper for the public interest, it is but meet that I should say that the present time is perhaps as convenient as any for making any changes that may be thought proper in the command of this army. It has not accomplished all that I had hoped or all that faction might demand; yet, composed as it is, one-half of perfectly new troops, it has defeated a powerful and thoroughly disciplined army in one battle and has driven it away baffled and dispirited at least, and as much demoralized as an army can be under such discipline as Bragg maintains over all troops that he commands. I will telegraph you more in detail in regard to the disposition of troops in Kentucky and other matters to-morrow.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Monday, October 15, 2012
Full Frontal Futility
The following report from Col. Edward M. McCook, first cousin of General Alexander McCook provides an accurate account of the retreat of the Confederate Army. In situations like this, cavalry were primarily used for scouting and engaging the fleeing enemy. The Colonel's formal education is revealed in his use of the French "Corps d'Armee" when referring to the newly adopted Federal Corps Command structure. For a review of this famous family from Ohio (via Pennsylvania) , see Wikipedia's page on Fighting McCooks .
The subsequent communications surviving from this day in 1862 are presented to illustrate the physical condition of Buell's Army as they pursued a fleeing Bragg who had adopted a scorched earth policy. The three days' rations carried by each soldier have run out and there is no forage materiel to be found. Once again, following the War Department's theory that the army's movement is hindered by an abundance of transportation has brought troop movement to a screeching halt. For this failure, Buell would be given the credit in his Court of Inquiry.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0618
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
October [15], 1862.
Major-General CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Second Corps d'Armee:
GENERAL: The enemy have undoubtedly left Lancester. They were passing through all last night; commenced to move yesterday evening, and their rear was still moving this evening. They are going in the direction of Crab Orchard. Both bridges over Hanging Fork were burned by them this afternoon. One regiment of my brigade (Colonel Wolford's) had a skirmish with them to-day on the Lancaster road, repulsing their cavalry and killing and wounding about 30. The Second Indiana also had a skirmish with them on the Dick Robinson road and drove them back.The information concerning their passing through Lancaster all last night is confirmed by the statements of 20 or 30 citizens who came to our lines on the road and I think cannot be doubtful.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD M. McCOOK,Colonel,
Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.
* * *
CRAWFORD STATION, October 15, 1862.
Colonel J. B. FRY, Chief of Staff:
Inclosed please find General Van Cleve's report.
The general desires a fresh division sent forward in time to reach Mount Vernon by daylight, as General Van Cleve's division is completely worn-out and will have to draw rations before marching.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. FLYNT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
(It is assumed that the above request to send a fresh division forward in time so that they could reach the city of Mount Vernon, Ky by midnight is a miss-reading of the above letter, but it is likely the only way Buell could have caught up with Bragg, at this point.)
* * *
If one of McCook's divisions cannot be sent forward the general will send forward Smith's.
* * *
OCTOBER 15, 1862 - 10 p. m.
General THOMAS, Second in Command:
GENERAL: Let the Second Corps push ahead after the enemy at the earliest hour practicable in the morning. The other corps can make no progress, as the road is so crowded, and they will not therefore march to-morrow unless it becomes necessary. If it is possible to collect forage at Mount Vernon have it done. Brigade will move direct to Mount Vernon. The supply trains are being hurried forward.Division commanders should send to Captain Chandler, chief quartermaster, and get supplies if needed.Issues must be made so as to give the men three days in haversacks. Captain Williams, McCook's commissary, is prepared to turn over some rations to Wood's division.
Respectfully, &c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
The subsequent communications surviving from this day in 1862 are presented to illustrate the physical condition of Buell's Army as they pursued a fleeing Bragg who had adopted a scorched earth policy. The three days' rations carried by each soldier have run out and there is no forage materiel to be found. Once again, following the War Department's theory that the army's movement is hindered by an abundance of transportation has brought troop movement to a screeching halt. For this failure, Buell would be given the credit in his Court of Inquiry.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0618
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
October [15], 1862.
Major-General CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Second Corps d'Armee:
GENERAL: The enemy have undoubtedly left Lancester. They were passing through all last night; commenced to move yesterday evening, and their rear was still moving this evening. They are going in the direction of Crab Orchard. Both bridges over Hanging Fork were burned by them this afternoon. One regiment of my brigade (Colonel Wolford's) had a skirmish with them to-day on the Lancaster road, repulsing their cavalry and killing and wounding about 30. The Second Indiana also had a skirmish with them on the Dick Robinson road and drove them back.The information concerning their passing through Lancaster all last night is confirmed by the statements of 20 or 30 citizens who came to our lines on the road and I think cannot be doubtful.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD M. McCOOK,Colonel,
Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.
* * *
CRAWFORD STATION, October 15, 1862.
Colonel J. B. FRY, Chief of Staff:
Inclosed please find General Van Cleve's report.
The general desires a fresh division sent forward in time to reach Mount Vernon by daylight, as General Van Cleve's division is completely worn-out and will have to draw rations before marching.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. FLYNT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
(It is assumed that the above request to send a fresh division forward in time so that they could reach the city of Mount Vernon, Ky by midnight is a miss-reading of the above letter, but it is likely the only way Buell could have caught up with Bragg, at this point.)
* * *
If one of McCook's divisions cannot be sent forward the general will send forward Smith's.
* * *
OCTOBER 15, 1862 - 10 p. m.
General THOMAS, Second in Command:
GENERAL: Let the Second Corps push ahead after the enemy at the earliest hour practicable in the morning. The other corps can make no progress, as the road is so crowded, and they will not therefore march to-morrow unless it becomes necessary. If it is possible to collect forage at Mount Vernon have it done. Brigade will move direct to Mount Vernon. The supply trains are being hurried forward.Division commanders should send to Captain Chandler, chief quartermaster, and get supplies if needed.Issues must be made so as to give the men three days in haversacks. Captain Williams, McCook's commissary, is prepared to turn over some rations to Wood's division.
Respectfully, &c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
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