General McCook's First Corps is heard from indirectly on this day in 1862. This Halloween day is the one appointed for the arrival of the Seventeenth Kentucky to arrive at Bowling Green, as per previous orders. They were no longer with the Fighting McCook when this telegram was transmitted.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0658
LOUISVILLE, KY., October 31, 1862.
Colonel A. STAGER:
A dispatch from General McCook to-night says Bragg is attempting by forced marches to reach Nashville ahead of our troops. A special states Bragg's intention is to push for Chattanooga for the purpose of advancing on Nashville. Has no provisions. Green River Bridge completed to-day.
SAM. BRUCH.
The following reply from General Halleck to General Thomas's letter of the previous day is printed out of sequence both here and in the Official Records in the interest of completeness. Thus closing the book on General Buell's tenure as the embattled general is being ordered to submit to a court of inquiry concerning his well-published failings.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0663
WASHINGTON, November 15, 1862.
Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn.:
GENERAL: Your letter of October 30 is just received. I cannot better state my appreciation of you as a general than by referring you to the fact that at Pittsburg Landing I urged upon the Secretary of War to secure your appointment as major-general, in order that I might place you in command of the right wing of the army over your then superiors. It was through my urgent solicitations that you were commissioned.
When it was determined to relieve General Buell another person was spoken of as his successor and it was through my repeated solicitation that you were appointed. you having virtually declined the command at that time it was necessary to appoint another, and General Rosecrans was selected.
You are mistaken about General rosecrans being your junior. His commission dates prior to yours. But that is of little importance, for the law gives to the president the power to assign without regard to dates, and he has seen fit to exercise it in this and many other cases.
Rest assured, general, that I fully appreciate your military capacity, and will do everything in my power to give you an independent command when an opportunity offers.
It was not possible to give you the command in Tennessee after you had once declined it.
Truly, yours.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
And Thomas's response follows by the same reasoning.
Ref.: ibid
GALLATIN, TENN., November 21, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of its tone.I should not have addressed you in the first place if I had known that General Rosecrans' commission dated prior to mine. The letter was written not because I desired a command but for being superseded, as I supposed, by a junior rank when I felt that there was no cause for so treating me.
I have no objection whatever to serving under General Rosecrans now that I know his commission dates prior to mine, but I must confess that I should feel very deeply mortified should the President place a junior over me without just cause, although the law authorizes him to do so should he see fit.
I am, general, very truly, yours,
GEO. H. THOMAS.
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.
This blog chronicles the life of the 17th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry in the American Civil War on the 150th aniversary of their service. Follow these volunteers through several major battles while experiencing both the pace and duration of the conflict. The posts may be read chronologically by accessing the archives and selecting them individually, beginning with the Preface.
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Buell Bids Farewell / Thomas Miffed
Having arrived in Louisville, General W.S. Rosecrans dispatches the letter from General Halleck to Buell at his headquarters in the Galt House with the following attachment.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0653
GALL [sic] HOUSE,
Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1862.
Major General D. C. BUELL, Gall[sic] House:
GENERAL: Inclosed I transmit the autograph letter of General Halleck, directing you on its presentation to turn over your present command to me and report at [Indianapolis
for orders.* I know the bearer of unwelcome new has a "losing office," but feel assured you are too high a gentleman and too true a soldier to permit this to produce any feelings of personal unkindness between us. I, like yourself, am neither an intriguer nor newspaper soldier. I go where I am ordered; but propriety will permit me to say that I have often felt indignant at the petty attacks on you by a portion of the press during the past summer, and that you had my high respect for ability as a soldier, for your firm adherence to truth and justice in the government and discipline of your command. I beg you, by our common profession and the love we bear our suffering country, to give me all the aid you can for the performance of duties of which no one better than yourself knows the difficulties.
Please name an hour and place most convenient for me to meet you.
Very truly and respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
---------------
*See Halleck to Buell, October 24, p. 642.
---------------
General Buell's farewell to his troops is issued in the form of a Special Order.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0654
SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
No. 50. Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1862.
In obedience to orders from the Headquarters of the Army, Major General Buell relinquishes the command of the District an Army of the Ohio to Major General W. S. Rosecrans.
It is impossible for the general without feelings of regard an a warn interest in their future success to part with troops whom he has been the instrument of converting for the most part form raw levies into a powerful army, honored by common consent for its discipline and efficient organization, for its esprit de corps, and for victories unqualified by single reverse, and whose reserve, and whose fortunes he has followed for a twelve mount over a field of operations embracing considerable portions of four States, thorough difficulties and dangers which its fortitude and courage have mastered without accident or failure. It has recently, by a rapid march of some 500 miles, with limited subsistence, often with an inadequate supply of water, returned to Kentucky and driven from her borders a powerful army; and having re-established its communications, is now well on its way to meet the enemy at other points.
The occasion is not convenient for recounting its services during the past twelve months, but the army may safety recur to them with pride. If anything has not been accomplished which was practicable within the sphere of its duty the general cheerfully holds himself responsible for the failure.
The general reflects with pride that the army under his command had for the most part been free from petty jealousies and intrigues; that it has neither indulged in vain boasting nor tarnished its high character by bickerings and low criminations. I will enhance his gratification if it shall carry to its new commander, who already has earned its confidence and respect by distinguished service the same noble qualities which have characterized it since its organization. He will pray that it may be the instrument of speedily restoring the union to its integrity, and there is no individual in its ranks in whose honor and welfare he will not feel a special interest.
By command of Major-General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
General George Thomas, who had been ordered to take command of Buell's troops in the failed restructuring attempt of late September, sends his objections to the selection of Rosecrans to General Halleck in Washington.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0657
CAMP NEAR CAMPBELLSVILLE, KY.,
October 30, 1862. Major General
H. W. HALLECK,
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: Soon after coming to Kentucky in 1861 I urged the Government to give me 20,000 men properly equipped to take the field that I might at least make the attempt to take Knoxville and secure East Tennessee. My suggestions were not listened to, bi there passed by in silence. Yet, without boasting, I believe I have exhibited at least sufficient energy to show that I had been intrusted with the command of that expedition at that time (October, 1861) I might have conducted it successfully. Before Corinth I was the command of the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee. I feel confident that I performed my duty patriotically and faithfully and with a reasonable amount of credit to myself. As soon as the emergency was over I was relieved and returned to the command of my old division. I went to duties without a murmur, as I am neither ambitious nor have any political aspirations.
On the 29th of last September I received an ordered through your aid, Colonel McKibbin, placing me in command of the Department of Tennessee, and directing General Buell to turn over his troops to me. This order reached me just as General Buell had by most extraordinary exertions prepared his army to pursue and drive the rebels from Kentucky. Feeling convinced that great injustice would be done him if not permitted to carry out his plans I requested that he might be retained in command. The order relieving him was suspended, but to day I am officially informed that he is relieved by General Rosecrans, yet feeling conscious that no just cause exists for overs laughing me by placing me under my junior, I feel deeply mortified and aggrieved at the action taken in this matter.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO, H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.
I do not desire the command of the Department of the Tennessee but that an officer senior to me in rank should be sent here if I am retained on duty in it.
GEO. H. THOMAS.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0653
GALL [sic] HOUSE,
Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1862.
Major General D. C. BUELL, Gall[sic] House:
GENERAL: Inclosed I transmit the autograph letter of General Halleck, directing you on its presentation to turn over your present command to me and report at [Indianapolis
for orders.* I know the bearer of unwelcome new has a "losing office," but feel assured you are too high a gentleman and too true a soldier to permit this to produce any feelings of personal unkindness between us. I, like yourself, am neither an intriguer nor newspaper soldier. I go where I am ordered; but propriety will permit me to say that I have often felt indignant at the petty attacks on you by a portion of the press during the past summer, and that you had my high respect for ability as a soldier, for your firm adherence to truth and justice in the government and discipline of your command. I beg you, by our common profession and the love we bear our suffering country, to give me all the aid you can for the performance of duties of which no one better than yourself knows the difficulties.
Please name an hour and place most convenient for me to meet you.
Very truly and respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
---------------
*See Halleck to Buell, October 24, p. 642.
---------------
General Buell's farewell to his troops is issued in the form of a Special Order.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0654
SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
No. 50. Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1862.
In obedience to orders from the Headquarters of the Army, Major General Buell relinquishes the command of the District an Army of the Ohio to Major General W. S. Rosecrans.
It is impossible for the general without feelings of regard an a warn interest in their future success to part with troops whom he has been the instrument of converting for the most part form raw levies into a powerful army, honored by common consent for its discipline and efficient organization, for its esprit de corps, and for victories unqualified by single reverse, and whose reserve, and whose fortunes he has followed for a twelve mount over a field of operations embracing considerable portions of four States, thorough difficulties and dangers which its fortitude and courage have mastered without accident or failure. It has recently, by a rapid march of some 500 miles, with limited subsistence, often with an inadequate supply of water, returned to Kentucky and driven from her borders a powerful army; and having re-established its communications, is now well on its way to meet the enemy at other points.
The occasion is not convenient for recounting its services during the past twelve months, but the army may safety recur to them with pride. If anything has not been accomplished which was practicable within the sphere of its duty the general cheerfully holds himself responsible for the failure.
The general reflects with pride that the army under his command had for the most part been free from petty jealousies and intrigues; that it has neither indulged in vain boasting nor tarnished its high character by bickerings and low criminations. I will enhance his gratification if it shall carry to its new commander, who already has earned its confidence and respect by distinguished service the same noble qualities which have characterized it since its organization. He will pray that it may be the instrument of speedily restoring the union to its integrity, and there is no individual in its ranks in whose honor and welfare he will not feel a special interest.
By command of Major-General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
General George Thomas, who had been ordered to take command of Buell's troops in the failed restructuring attempt of late September, sends his objections to the selection of Rosecrans to General Halleck in Washington.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0657
CAMP NEAR CAMPBELLSVILLE, KY.,
October 30, 1862. Major General
H. W. HALLECK,
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: Soon after coming to Kentucky in 1861 I urged the Government to give me 20,000 men properly equipped to take the field that I might at least make the attempt to take Knoxville and secure East Tennessee. My suggestions were not listened to, bi there passed by in silence. Yet, without boasting, I believe I have exhibited at least sufficient energy to show that I had been intrusted with the command of that expedition at that time (October, 1861) I might have conducted it successfully. Before Corinth I was the command of the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee. I feel confident that I performed my duty patriotically and faithfully and with a reasonable amount of credit to myself. As soon as the emergency was over I was relieved and returned to the command of my old division. I went to duties without a murmur, as I am neither ambitious nor have any political aspirations.
On the 29th of last September I received an ordered through your aid, Colonel McKibbin, placing me in command of the Department of Tennessee, and directing General Buell to turn over his troops to me. This order reached me just as General Buell had by most extraordinary exertions prepared his army to pursue and drive the rebels from Kentucky. Feeling convinced that great injustice would be done him if not permitted to carry out his plans I requested that he might be retained in command. The order relieving him was suspended, but to day I am officially informed that he is relieved by General Rosecrans, yet feeling conscious that no just cause exists for overs laughing me by placing me under my junior, I feel deeply mortified and aggrieved at the action taken in this matter.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO, H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.
I do not desire the command of the Department of the Tennessee but that an officer senior to me in rank should be sent here if I am retained on duty in it.
GEO. H. THOMAS.
Monday, October 29, 2012
Who's in Charge? (Ver. 2)
It seems everyone except Buell has been informed of his dismissal. The general sends this tersely worded telegram to his commanding officer in Washington to request clearification of his position. Apparently Buell has returned to his headquarters at Louisville.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0651
LOUISVILLE, KY ., October 29, 1862-11.30 a. m.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
If, as the papers report, my successor has been appointed, it is important that I should know it, and that he should enter on the command immediately, as the troops are already in motion.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
And to General Thomas...
Ref.: Ibid
OCTOBER 29, [1862].
General THOMAS, Lebanon:
I have just seen your letter to Fry.* I judge from what appears in the papers that Rosecrans has been ordered to relieve me. Under the circumstances I am sure I do not grieve about it.
D. C. BUELL.
* not found
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0651
LOUISVILLE, KY ., October 29, 1862-11.30 a. m.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
If, as the papers report, my successor has been appointed, it is important that I should know it, and that he should enter on the command immediately, as the troops are already in motion.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
And to General Thomas...
Ref.: Ibid
OCTOBER 29, [1862].
General THOMAS, Lebanon:
I have just seen your letter to Fry.* I judge from what appears in the papers that Rosecrans has been ordered to relieve me. Under the circumstances I am sure I do not grieve about it.
D. C. BUELL.
* not found
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Rosecrans in Cincinnati
On this day in 1862 General Rosecrans arrives in Cincinnati to relieve Buell of his command of the Army of the Cumberland. His instructions were to deliver the orders to General Buell at his headquarters. Rosecrans is about 100 miles off the mark, since it is well known that General Buell is near Crab Orchard, southeast of his headquarters at Louisville. Rosey must have taken this detour to consult with General Wright at Cincinnati. He also takes time to update General Grant in regards to his new position, which will take effect when he reaches Buell's camp.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0650
CINCINNATI, OHIO, October 28, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK:
Arrived here at 11 a. m. Have received yours, inclosing your letter to Major-General Buell, copy of General Orders, No. 138, and your letter of instructions. I shall proceed at once to carry them out. My horses will reach here to-night. I will leave to-morrow for General Buell's headquarters.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
* * *
CINCINNATI, October 28, [1862].
Major-General GRANT:
My orders are to relieve General Buell and assume command of the Department of the Cumberland, and we are to co-operate so far as possible to support each other's operations. Please keep me advised, and I will do the same for you.I will go to Louisville to-morrow.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
Meanwhile, the beleaguered general is directing troop movements from his field command, unaware of the change about to come. He surely assumed that, if he were to be relieved of command, Major -General Thomas, who has been serving as his Second-in-Command since the previous botched restructuring, would again be appointed his successor.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0650
CINCINNATI, OHIO, October 28, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK:
Arrived here at 11 a. m. Have received yours, inclosing your letter to Major-General Buell, copy of General Orders, No. 138, and your letter of instructions. I shall proceed at once to carry them out. My horses will reach here to-night. I will leave to-morrow for General Buell's headquarters.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
* * *
CINCINNATI, October 28, [1862].
Major-General GRANT:
My orders are to relieve General Buell and assume command of the Department of the Cumberland, and we are to co-operate so far as possible to support each other's operations. Please keep me advised, and I will do the same for you.I will go to Louisville to-morrow.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
Meanwhile, the beleaguered general is directing troop movements from his field command, unaware of the change about to come. He surely assumed that, if he were to be relieved of command, Major -General Thomas, who has been serving as his Second-in-Command since the previous botched restructuring, would again be appointed his successor.
Saturday, October 27, 2012
Buell's Support Arrives Too Late
General Buell may have had many powerful detractors, but Kentucky Senator James Guthrie presents this letter in support of the embattled general on this day in 1862.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0646
LOUISVILLE, KY., October 27, 1862 - 11.45 a. m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
The renewed rumors of the removal of General Buell I hope are without foundation. If he should be removed a winter campaign with his army - now the best in the service - will be lost, and perhaps Nashville and all Middle Tennessee and West Tennessee in danger, without the possibility of relief to East Tennessee. His army is now again on the march south and good results must be achieved by it. He has confidence of most, if not all, of his generals and of all thinking men here. When he could no longer get supplies by the Tennessee and Cumberland River and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was destroyed his army was put on half rations. In this condition he could not advance on the enemy. He fell back and saved Nashville; then fell back and saved Bowling Green and Southern Kentucky; then fell back and saved Louisville, and brought through all his baggage trains without loss, and now has driven Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky. The battle of Perryville proves the efficiency of his army and the character of his officers. No reflecting man here believe Bragg would fight Buell's army unless he could throw his whole force on a single division. His retreat is the prof of the correctness of their judgment. No general can now take his place without injury to the service and the cause. The clamors of the press and of unfeeling men for more bloody fields, without regard to results obtained and reasonable future ones, in my judgment should not prevail. The complaint about the organization of his army and the wrong inflicted on the inhabitants are intrude as to the old regiments, but true as to the new ones to a lamentable extent. They are of course being corrected. I repeat again, I hope General Buell has not and will not be removed.
JAMES GUTHRIE.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0646
LOUISVILLE, KY., October 27, 1862 - 11.45 a. m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
The renewed rumors of the removal of General Buell I hope are without foundation. If he should be removed a winter campaign with his army - now the best in the service - will be lost, and perhaps Nashville and all Middle Tennessee and West Tennessee in danger, without the possibility of relief to East Tennessee. His army is now again on the march south and good results must be achieved by it. He has confidence of most, if not all, of his generals and of all thinking men here. When he could no longer get supplies by the Tennessee and Cumberland River and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was destroyed his army was put on half rations. In this condition he could not advance on the enemy. He fell back and saved Nashville; then fell back and saved Bowling Green and Southern Kentucky; then fell back and saved Louisville, and brought through all his baggage trains without loss, and now has driven Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky. The battle of Perryville proves the efficiency of his army and the character of his officers. No reflecting man here believe Bragg would fight Buell's army unless he could throw his whole force on a single division. His retreat is the prof of the correctness of their judgment. No general can now take his place without injury to the service and the cause. The clamors of the press and of unfeeling men for more bloody fields, without regard to results obtained and reasonable future ones, in my judgment should not prevail. The complaint about the organization of his army and the wrong inflicted on the inhabitants are intrude as to the old regiments, but true as to the new ones to a lamentable extent. They are of course being corrected. I repeat again, I hope General Buell has not and will not be removed.
JAMES GUTHRIE.
Friday, October 26, 2012
Dealing with Insurgents
In a policy statement issued as a Special Order on this day in 1862, General Buell sets forth his plan for dealing with captured rebels and, more important to our story, Kentucky citizens found to be supporting the enemy. General Rosecrans has apparently yet to arrive.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0646
GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
No. 49. In Camp, October 26, 1862.
I. All recruits for the rebel army captured or arrested by troops of this command will be regarded as prisoners of war, and sent without delay to Vicksburg and there paroled and left subject to exchange.
II. All persons who have actively aided or abetted in the invasion of Kentucky by rebel troops within the last three months will be immediately arrested and sent to Vicksburg, Miss., and forbidden to return to Kentucky. This order will not be understood as including persons indicted or help by the civil authorities for trial, nor will arrests be made on suspicion or insufficient evidence of guilt.
Brigadier General J. T. Boyle is charged with the execution of these orders, and will give such special instructions as may be found necessary.
By command of Major-General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0646
GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
No. 49. In Camp, October 26, 1862.
I. All recruits for the rebel army captured or arrested by troops of this command will be regarded as prisoners of war, and sent without delay to Vicksburg and there paroled and left subject to exchange.
II. All persons who have actively aided or abetted in the invasion of Kentucky by rebel troops within the last three months will be immediately arrested and sent to Vicksburg, Miss., and forbidden to return to Kentucky. This order will not be understood as including persons indicted or help by the civil authorities for trial, nor will arrests be made on suspicion or insufficient evidence of guilt.
Brigadier General J. T. Boyle is charged with the execution of these orders, and will give such special instructions as may be found necessary.
By command of Major-General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
Thursday, October 25, 2012
Rosecrans Receives Vote of Confidence
The growing political pressure from the northwestern states of Indiana and Illinois is relieved by Lincoln's departmental restructuring and Rosecrans' new appointment.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0642
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., October 25, 1862 - 10.40 a. m.
His Excellency PRESIDENT: We were to start to-night for Washington to confer with you in regard to Kentucky affairs. the removal of General Buell and appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. The removal of General Buell could not have been delayed an hour with safety to the army or the cause. The history of the battle of Perryville and the recent campaign in Kentucky has never been told. The action you have taken renders our visit unnecessary, although we are very desirous to confer with you in regard to the general condition of the Northwest, and hope to do so at no distant period.
RICH'D YATES,
Governor of Illinois.
O. P. MORTON,
Governor of Indiana.
Meanwhile, back at headquarters, Colonel Fry sends the following orders to Buell's Second-in-Command with no reference to a higher authority. The Seventeenth Kentucky, in Rousseau's Division is ordered to Bowling Green from their current location near Lebanon. Note that this is in the direction of Nashville, not East Tennessee. The march will cover more than 100 miles of hilly terrain and the soldiers will have to forage for fresh water as there is only one significant source along the route. They are alotted five days to accomplish this feat.
Ref.: ibid
OCTOBER 25, 1862.
General THOMAS, Lebanon:
Crittenden's corps will proceed to Glasgow as fast as it reached Columbia. If its baggage should not have arrived it will follow. It must be at Glasgow entire by the 31st. Put McCook's division in motion by way of Summersville, Horse Well, and Bowling Green. It must reach Bowling Green by the 31st. Rations will meet it at Bell's. Crittenden's division will draw rations from Cave City or Munfordville. Direct the First and Third Divisions (Schoepf's and Rousseau's) to march for Bowling Green by Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Glasgow. They must reast Bowling Green by the 1st proximo and Glasgow by the 29th. Rations for them all will be at Cave City.
JAMES B. FRY.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0642
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., October 25, 1862 - 10.40 a. m.
His Excellency PRESIDENT: We were to start to-night for Washington to confer with you in regard to Kentucky affairs. the removal of General Buell and appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. The removal of General Buell could not have been delayed an hour with safety to the army or the cause. The history of the battle of Perryville and the recent campaign in Kentucky has never been told. The action you have taken renders our visit unnecessary, although we are very desirous to confer with you in regard to the general condition of the Northwest, and hope to do so at no distant period.
RICH'D YATES,
Governor of Illinois.
O. P. MORTON,
Governor of Indiana.
Meanwhile, back at headquarters, Colonel Fry sends the following orders to Buell's Second-in-Command with no reference to a higher authority. The Seventeenth Kentucky, in Rousseau's Division is ordered to Bowling Green from their current location near Lebanon. Note that this is in the direction of Nashville, not East Tennessee. The march will cover more than 100 miles of hilly terrain and the soldiers will have to forage for fresh water as there is only one significant source along the route. They are alotted five days to accomplish this feat.
Ref.: ibid
OCTOBER 25, 1862.
General THOMAS, Lebanon:
Crittenden's corps will proceed to Glasgow as fast as it reached Columbia. If its baggage should not have arrived it will follow. It must be at Glasgow entire by the 31st. Put McCook's division in motion by way of Summersville, Horse Well, and Bowling Green. It must reach Bowling Green by the 31st. Rations will meet it at Bell's. Crittenden's division will draw rations from Cave City or Munfordville. Direct the First and Third Divisions (Schoepf's and Rousseau's) to march for Bowling Green by Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Glasgow. They must reast Bowling Green by the 1st proximo and Glasgow by the 29th. Rations for them all will be at Cave City.
JAMES B. FRY.
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
Rosey in for Buell
In deference to all of the controversy stemming from the events of this day in 1862, the following communications are printed in their entirity.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0640
WASHINGTON, October [24], 1862.
Major General W. S. ROSECRANS, Cincinnati, Ohio:
You will receive herewith the order of the President placing you in command of the Department of the Cumberland and of the army of operations now under Major-General Buell.
You will immediately repair to General Buell's headquarters and relieve him from the command.*
The great objects to be kept in view in your operations in the field are: First, to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Middle Tennessee; second, to take and hold East Tennessee, cutting the line of railroad at Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, so as to destroy the connection of the valley of Virginia with Georgia and the other Southern States. It is hoped that by prompt and rapid movements a considerable part of this may be accomplished before the roads become impassable from the winter rains.
Two modes of reaching East Tennessee have been proposed. First, to push a small force on the rear of Bragg's army to drive him into Tennessee and move the main army on such lines as to cover Nashville; second, to go directly to Nashville and make that the base of your operations, by McMinnville or Cookville. Adopting the first plan, the route by Somerset to Montgomery, if practicable, would be the most direct; if not practicable, it would then be necessary to move by Columbia or Glasgow to Sparta, &c. If the second plan be adopted, you will be obliged to move twice the distance in order to reach your objective point and at the same time afford the enemy an opportunity to resumed his raids into Kentucky. Moreover, it would give the appearance of a retreat, which would encourage the enemy, while it would discourage our own troops and the country. Nevertheless, the difficulty or the roads, the pressure of the enemy upon Nashville, the position in which you find General Buell's army, and the difficulty of supplying it in a mountainous and sparsely populated country may compel you to adopt this line. In either case it will be necessary for you to repair and guard the railroad, so as to secure your supplies from Louisville until the Cumberland River becomes navigable.
You will fully appreciate the importance of moving light and rapidly, and also the necessity of procuring as many of your supplies as possible in the country passed over. Where your cannot obtain enough by purchase of loyal men or requisitions upon the disloyal you will make forced requisitions upon the country, paying or receipting, as the case may be, for the supplies taken. The time has now come when we must apply the sterner rules of war, whenever such application becomes necessary, to enable us to support our armies and to move them rapidly upon the enemy. You will not hesitate to do this in all cases where the exigencies of the war require it.
Great care, however, must be taken to prevent straggling and pillaging and a strict account must be kept of all property taken. On this subject your attention is called to recent general orders and also to the system adopted in the French Army.
In connection with your proposed operations in Middle and East Tennessee, a column of about 20,000 men, under General Cox, is moving up the Kanawha river, and it is hoped that they will be able to cut the railroad near Newbern or Wytheville. This movement may possibly draw off a portion of Bragg's forces for the protection of that road.
Moreover, if the enemy's forces in Mississippi now operating against General Grant should be drawn east to re-enforce Bragg of to operate in Tennessee General Grant may be able to render you important assistance.
Although the Department of the Ohio covers a portion of your theater of operations this will in no respect interfere with your movements in the field nor the command of your army. Moreover, you will call upon General Wright for any assistance of supplies which you may require.
It is possible that Bragg, having failed of his object in Kentucky, may leave only a small force in East Tennessee and throw his main army into Mississippi against General Grant. His railroad communications from Knoxville to Holly Springs and Tupelo will enable him to make this movement with great rapidity. In that case a part of your forces must be sent to the assistance of General Grant, either by railroad to Decatur of by water, should the Cumberland be navigable, to Columbus or Memphis. Every effort should be make to ascertain Bragg's movements by pressing him closely.
I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment to your forces. Neither the country nor the Government will much longer put up with the inactively of some of our armies and generals.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
---------------
* See Rosecrans to Buell, October 1862, p.635.
---------------
[Inclosure No. 1.]
GENERAL ORDERS,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJT. General 'S OFFICE,
No. 168. Washington, October 24, 1862.
I. By direction of the President the State of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River and such parts of Northern Alabama and Georgia as may be taken possession of by United States troops will constitute the Department of the Cumberland.
II. Major General W. S. Rosecrans is assigned to the command of the Department of the Cumberland.
III. The troops under the command of Major-General Grant will constitute the Thirteenth Army Corps, and those assigned to the command of Major-General Rosecrans will constitute the Fourteenth Army Corps.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS,Adjutant-General.
[Inclosure No. 2.]
WASHINGTON, October 24, 1862.
Major General D. C. BUELL,
Commanding, &c.:
GENERAL: The President directs that on the presentation of this order you will turn over your command to Major General W. S. Rosecrans, and repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting from that place to the Adjutant-General of the Army for further orders.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0640
WASHINGTON, October [24], 1862.
Major General W. S. ROSECRANS, Cincinnati, Ohio:
You will receive herewith the order of the President placing you in command of the Department of the Cumberland and of the army of operations now under Major-General Buell.
You will immediately repair to General Buell's headquarters and relieve him from the command.*
The great objects to be kept in view in your operations in the field are: First, to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Middle Tennessee; second, to take and hold East Tennessee, cutting the line of railroad at Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, so as to destroy the connection of the valley of Virginia with Georgia and the other Southern States. It is hoped that by prompt and rapid movements a considerable part of this may be accomplished before the roads become impassable from the winter rains.
Two modes of reaching East Tennessee have been proposed. First, to push a small force on the rear of Bragg's army to drive him into Tennessee and move the main army on such lines as to cover Nashville; second, to go directly to Nashville and make that the base of your operations, by McMinnville or Cookville. Adopting the first plan, the route by Somerset to Montgomery, if practicable, would be the most direct; if not practicable, it would then be necessary to move by Columbia or Glasgow to Sparta, &c. If the second plan be adopted, you will be obliged to move twice the distance in order to reach your objective point and at the same time afford the enemy an opportunity to resumed his raids into Kentucky. Moreover, it would give the appearance of a retreat, which would encourage the enemy, while it would discourage our own troops and the country. Nevertheless, the difficulty or the roads, the pressure of the enemy upon Nashville, the position in which you find General Buell's army, and the difficulty of supplying it in a mountainous and sparsely populated country may compel you to adopt this line. In either case it will be necessary for you to repair and guard the railroad, so as to secure your supplies from Louisville until the Cumberland River becomes navigable.
You will fully appreciate the importance of moving light and rapidly, and also the necessity of procuring as many of your supplies as possible in the country passed over. Where your cannot obtain enough by purchase of loyal men or requisitions upon the disloyal you will make forced requisitions upon the country, paying or receipting, as the case may be, for the supplies taken. The time has now come when we must apply the sterner rules of war, whenever such application becomes necessary, to enable us to support our armies and to move them rapidly upon the enemy. You will not hesitate to do this in all cases where the exigencies of the war require it.
Great care, however, must be taken to prevent straggling and pillaging and a strict account must be kept of all property taken. On this subject your attention is called to recent general orders and also to the system adopted in the French Army.
In connection with your proposed operations in Middle and East Tennessee, a column of about 20,000 men, under General Cox, is moving up the Kanawha river, and it is hoped that they will be able to cut the railroad near Newbern or Wytheville. This movement may possibly draw off a portion of Bragg's forces for the protection of that road.
Moreover, if the enemy's forces in Mississippi now operating against General Grant should be drawn east to re-enforce Bragg of to operate in Tennessee General Grant may be able to render you important assistance.
Although the Department of the Ohio covers a portion of your theater of operations this will in no respect interfere with your movements in the field nor the command of your army. Moreover, you will call upon General Wright for any assistance of supplies which you may require.
It is possible that Bragg, having failed of his object in Kentucky, may leave only a small force in East Tennessee and throw his main army into Mississippi against General Grant. His railroad communications from Knoxville to Holly Springs and Tupelo will enable him to make this movement with great rapidity. In that case a part of your forces must be sent to the assistance of General Grant, either by railroad to Decatur of by water, should the Cumberland be navigable, to Columbus or Memphis. Every effort should be make to ascertain Bragg's movements by pressing him closely.
I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment to your forces. Neither the country nor the Government will much longer put up with the inactively of some of our armies and generals.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
---------------
* See Rosecrans to Buell, October 1862, p.635.
---------------
[Inclosure No. 1.]
GENERAL ORDERS,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJT. General 'S OFFICE,
No. 168. Washington, October 24, 1862.
I. By direction of the President the State of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River and such parts of Northern Alabama and Georgia as may be taken possession of by United States troops will constitute the Department of the Cumberland.
II. Major General W. S. Rosecrans is assigned to the command of the Department of the Cumberland.
III. The troops under the command of Major-General Grant will constitute the Thirteenth Army Corps, and those assigned to the command of Major-General Rosecrans will constitute the Fourteenth Army Corps.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS,Adjutant-General.
[Inclosure No. 2.]
WASHINGTON, October 24, 1862.
Major General D. C. BUELL,
Commanding, &c.:
GENERAL: The President directs that on the presentation of this order you will turn over your command to Major General W. S. Rosecrans, and repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting from that place to the Adjutant-General of the Army for further orders.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
Buell Ordered to East Tennessee Posthaste
On or about this day in 1862, Buell is again cautioned against falling back on Nashville. The political pressures noted previously are clearly having an influence on mimlitary strategy. The footnotes are copied as printed on the eHistory website.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0638
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 23,* 1862.
Major-General BUELL, Lebanon, Ky.:
Your three dispatches of yesterday+ are received and will be submitted to the Secretary and President to day. It is the wish of the government that your army proceed to and occupy East Tennessee with all possible dispatch. It leaves to you the selection of the roads upon which to move to that object; but is urges that this selection be so made as to cover Nashville and at the same time prevent the enemy's return into Kentucky. To now withdraw your army to Nashville would have a most disastrous effect upon the country, already wearied with son many delays in our operations. To wait for the rising of the Cumberland for supplies will carry us into the rainy season, when the roads will be almost impassable and the campaign will terminate with no results Neither the Government nor the country can endure these repeated delays. Both require a prompt and immediate movement toward the accomplishment of the great object in view - the holding of East Tennessee.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
---------------
* True date appears to have been October 22, 12.20 p. m.
+ One of these dispatches refers to prisoners of war, and will appear in Series II; the others appear as of October 22, on pp.636, 637.
Meanwhile, in a move that will have great significance for the Seventeenth Kentucky and the rest of Buell's Army of the Ohio, General William Starke Rosecrans is sent this telegram from Washington.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0639
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 23, 1862.
Major-General ROSECRANS, Corinth, Miss.:
You will immediately repair to Cincinnati, where you will receive orders. Telegraph your arrival. Go with the least possible delay.
H. W. HALLECK.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0638
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 23,* 1862.
Major-General BUELL, Lebanon, Ky.:
Your three dispatches of yesterday+ are received and will be submitted to the Secretary and President to day. It is the wish of the government that your army proceed to and occupy East Tennessee with all possible dispatch. It leaves to you the selection of the roads upon which to move to that object; but is urges that this selection be so made as to cover Nashville and at the same time prevent the enemy's return into Kentucky. To now withdraw your army to Nashville would have a most disastrous effect upon the country, already wearied with son many delays in our operations. To wait for the rising of the Cumberland for supplies will carry us into the rainy season, when the roads will be almost impassable and the campaign will terminate with no results Neither the Government nor the country can endure these repeated delays. Both require a prompt and immediate movement toward the accomplishment of the great object in view - the holding of East Tennessee.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
---------------
* True date appears to have been October 22, 12.20 p. m.
+ One of these dispatches refers to prisoners of war, and will appear in Series II; the others appear as of October 22, on pp.636, 637.
Meanwhile, in a move that will have great significance for the Seventeenth Kentucky and the rest of Buell's Army of the Ohio, General William Starke Rosecrans is sent this telegram from Washington.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0639
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 23, 1862.
Major-General ROSECRANS, Corinth, Miss.:
You will immediately repair to Cincinnati, where you will receive orders. Telegraph your arrival. Go with the least possible delay.
H. W. HALLECK.
Monday, October 22, 2012
A Plea of Hardship , A Dose of Reality
Representative Horace Maynard of eastern Tennessee sends the following appeal to General-in-Chief Halleck on this day in 1862. He had made the same request on October 10th. This letter is included in today's post merely to show the level of fatigue that is settling over citizens and soldiers alike.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0635
WESTBOROUGH, October 22, 1862.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General, Commanding, &c.:
SIR: On the 10th instant I had the honor to address you in relation to an alleged order sending into Western Virginia the East Tennessee troops just from Cumberland Gap under General G. W. Morgan.Since then I have received a letter form one of the field officers of that corps, a constituent of mine, upon the same subject. After giving a detailed account of their operations from early in August, he adds "The health of the men is excellent, and thought they are worried, they are in good spirits. The whole division is literally naked and barefooted and without equipage. We are ordered to Western Virginia, but men swear they will not go. Please have the order revoked and us ordered to Kentucky. General Wright want us to go there and we want to go. But we have been so long in the mountains that to send us to Virginia, where our army was frozen and starved out last winter, in our condition is an outrage. Such a dirty set as we are and ragged never was seen before since the Revolution. At least 50 of our men cam through without shoes. Please get the order to go to Western Virginia countermanded at once.
I beg again to call your attention to this matter. These men entered the service under very great difficulties, for the purpose primarily of defending their homes and families from rebel oppression and outrage. Our State, as you know, is now overrun by rebel arms, Military operations on a large scale will be be conducted there during the fall and winter. Obivious considerations require that these troops should be taken where they would have an efficiency that they could not have in a different field, and where they could render more efficient services than troops of equal general merit from any of the Northern States. But, more, I plead upon the high ground of right their claims where their own soil is the scene of conflict t be allowed to bear a part in the strife. I will not elaborate these views into as argument which your own mind will readily anticipate, but trust this matter without further remark to your wisdom and sense of justice.
I am, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
HORACE MAYNARD.
And from General Buell, Halleck receives more discouragement on this day in 1862 in this harsh but accurate portrayal of reality.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0636
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Danville, Ky., October 22,* 1862 - 1 a. m.
(Received October 22, 2.20 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
I am very grateful for the approbation expressed in your dispatch of 17th [18th?]. I have also received your dispatch of yesterday [19th], conveying orders for moving into East Tennessee. Undoubtedly the present is in may respects a favorable opportunity for the movement. Far from making objections, the object of my dispatch was to call attention to its importance, but at the same time I suggested the difficulties, so that the requisite means could be provided if possible. In speaking of Tennessee as being nearer the heart of the enemy's resources, I meant that he could concentrate his troops there rapidly. I have no doubt you realize that the occupation of East Tennessee with a suitable force is an undertaking of very considerable magnitude, and that if undertaken unadvisedly it will fail.
I venture to give you my views:
If the enemy puts himself on the defensive in East Tennessee it will require an available force of 80,000 men to take and hold it. If our army can subsist on the country so much the better; but it will not do to rely solely on that source. If we can obtain forage and one-half our breadstuffs that for the present is probably as much as we can do; everything else must be hauled. Nashville is essential as a depot; afterward McMinnville. Gainesborough will be an important point for us as soon as the navigation of the Cumberland opens, which may not be for two months. We can procure all of our forage and breadstuffs and some meat form Middle Tennessee, but Nashville and the vicinity must be rid of the enemy in any considerable force. We cannot otherwise collect supplies. The enemy has repaired and is now using the Chattanooga Railroad to Murfreesborough, and is threatening Nashville somewhat seriously, as appears form a dispatch received to-day from General Negley, which I send you. this danger has no reference to Bragg's movements. then, if the enemy should not be there in heavy force, it would not be necessary or desirable to go to nashville in full force. We could cross the Cumberland Gap [missing phrase] being out of the question. The railroad to nashville must be opened and rendered secure, because, until navigation opens, that is the only channel for supplies. A part of the route to East Tennessee is mountainous and destitute of supplies of every sort. As we advance depots of forage, to be supplied form the productive region, must be established to carry our trains across the sterile region - say at McMinnville and Cookville - but that will not delay the advance of the army.
From these data I make this estimate:
Taking matters as they stand, 20,000 men, distributed pretty much as indicated in my previous dispatch, should be kept in Kentucky; 20,000 in Middle Tennessee and on the line of communication to East Tennessee, and 80,000 should be available in any field in East Tennessee. Bragg's force in Kentucky has not fallen much, if any, short of 60,000 men. It will not be difficult for him to increase it to 80,000 men on the line of the East Tennessee Railroad. I could in an hour's conversation give you my views and explain the routes and character of the country better than I can in a dispatch, and perhaps satisfactorily; and if you think it worth while I can see you in Washington without deferring my movements, provided you concur in the expediency of moving first in the direction of Nashville; in fact, we must of necessity move so as to turn Jamestown and Montgomery. It will also help to conceal our plans. We can give good reasons why we cannot do all that the enemy has attempted to do, such as operating without a base, &c., without ascribing the difference to the inferiority of our generals, though that may be true. The spirit of the rebellion enforces a subordination and patient submission to privation and want which public sentiment renders absolutely impossible among our troops. To make matters worse on our side, the death penalty for any offense whatever is put beyond the power of the commanders of armies, where it is placed in every other army in the world. The sooner this is remedied the better for the country. It is absolutely certain that from these causes, and from these alone, the discipline of the rebel army is superior to ours. Again, instead of imitating the enemy's plan (campaign) I should rather say that his failure has been in a measure due to his peculiar method. No army can operate effectually upon less than this has done in the last two months. A considerable part of the time it has been on half rations; it is now moving without tents, with only such cooking utensils as the men can carry, and with one baggage wagon to each regiment; but is must continue to do this during the cold, wet weather which must soon be expected, without being disabled by sickness.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General, Commanding.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0635
WESTBOROUGH, October 22, 1862.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General, Commanding, &c.:
SIR: On the 10th instant I had the honor to address you in relation to an alleged order sending into Western Virginia the East Tennessee troops just from Cumberland Gap under General G. W. Morgan.Since then I have received a letter form one of the field officers of that corps, a constituent of mine, upon the same subject. After giving a detailed account of their operations from early in August, he adds "The health of the men is excellent, and thought they are worried, they are in good spirits. The whole division is literally naked and barefooted and without equipage. We are ordered to Western Virginia, but men swear they will not go. Please have the order revoked and us ordered to Kentucky. General Wright want us to go there and we want to go. But we have been so long in the mountains that to send us to Virginia, where our army was frozen and starved out last winter, in our condition is an outrage. Such a dirty set as we are and ragged never was seen before since the Revolution. At least 50 of our men cam through without shoes. Please get the order to go to Western Virginia countermanded at once.
I beg again to call your attention to this matter. These men entered the service under very great difficulties, for the purpose primarily of defending their homes and families from rebel oppression and outrage. Our State, as you know, is now overrun by rebel arms, Military operations on a large scale will be be conducted there during the fall and winter. Obivious considerations require that these troops should be taken where they would have an efficiency that they could not have in a different field, and where they could render more efficient services than troops of equal general merit from any of the Northern States. But, more, I plead upon the high ground of right their claims where their own soil is the scene of conflict t be allowed to bear a part in the strife. I will not elaborate these views into as argument which your own mind will readily anticipate, but trust this matter without further remark to your wisdom and sense of justice.
I am, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
HORACE MAYNARD.
And from General Buell, Halleck receives more discouragement on this day in 1862 in this harsh but accurate portrayal of reality.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0636
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Danville, Ky., October 22,* 1862 - 1 a. m.
(Received October 22, 2.20 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
I am very grateful for the approbation expressed in your dispatch of 17th [18th?]. I have also received your dispatch of yesterday [19th], conveying orders for moving into East Tennessee. Undoubtedly the present is in may respects a favorable opportunity for the movement. Far from making objections, the object of my dispatch was to call attention to its importance, but at the same time I suggested the difficulties, so that the requisite means could be provided if possible. In speaking of Tennessee as being nearer the heart of the enemy's resources, I meant that he could concentrate his troops there rapidly. I have no doubt you realize that the occupation of East Tennessee with a suitable force is an undertaking of very considerable magnitude, and that if undertaken unadvisedly it will fail.
I venture to give you my views:
If the enemy puts himself on the defensive in East Tennessee it will require an available force of 80,000 men to take and hold it. If our army can subsist on the country so much the better; but it will not do to rely solely on that source. If we can obtain forage and one-half our breadstuffs that for the present is probably as much as we can do; everything else must be hauled. Nashville is essential as a depot; afterward McMinnville. Gainesborough will be an important point for us as soon as the navigation of the Cumberland opens, which may not be for two months. We can procure all of our forage and breadstuffs and some meat form Middle Tennessee, but Nashville and the vicinity must be rid of the enemy in any considerable force. We cannot otherwise collect supplies. The enemy has repaired and is now using the Chattanooga Railroad to Murfreesborough, and is threatening Nashville somewhat seriously, as appears form a dispatch received to-day from General Negley, which I send you. this danger has no reference to Bragg's movements. then, if the enemy should not be there in heavy force, it would not be necessary or desirable to go to nashville in full force. We could cross the Cumberland Gap [missing phrase] being out of the question. The railroad to nashville must be opened and rendered secure, because, until navigation opens, that is the only channel for supplies. A part of the route to East Tennessee is mountainous and destitute of supplies of every sort. As we advance depots of forage, to be supplied form the productive region, must be established to carry our trains across the sterile region - say at McMinnville and Cookville - but that will not delay the advance of the army.
From these data I make this estimate:
Taking matters as they stand, 20,000 men, distributed pretty much as indicated in my previous dispatch, should be kept in Kentucky; 20,000 in Middle Tennessee and on the line of communication to East Tennessee, and 80,000 should be available in any field in East Tennessee. Bragg's force in Kentucky has not fallen much, if any, short of 60,000 men. It will not be difficult for him to increase it to 80,000 men on the line of the East Tennessee Railroad. I could in an hour's conversation give you my views and explain the routes and character of the country better than I can in a dispatch, and perhaps satisfactorily; and if you think it worth while I can see you in Washington without deferring my movements, provided you concur in the expediency of moving first in the direction of Nashville; in fact, we must of necessity move so as to turn Jamestown and Montgomery. It will also help to conceal our plans. We can give good reasons why we cannot do all that the enemy has attempted to do, such as operating without a base, &c., without ascribing the difference to the inferiority of our generals, though that may be true. The spirit of the rebellion enforces a subordination and patient submission to privation and want which public sentiment renders absolutely impossible among our troops. To make matters worse on our side, the death penalty for any offense whatever is put beyond the power of the commanders of armies, where it is placed in every other army in the world. The sooner this is remedied the better for the country. It is absolutely certain that from these causes, and from these alone, the discipline of the rebel army is superior to ours. Again, instead of imitating the enemy's plan (campaign) I should rather say that his failure has been in a measure due to his peculiar method. No army can operate effectually upon less than this has done in the last two months. A considerable part of the time it has been on half rations; it is now moving without tents, with only such cooking utensils as the men can carry, and with one baggage wagon to each regiment; but is must continue to do this during the cold, wet weather which must soon be expected, without being disabled by sickness.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General, Commanding.
Sunday, October 21, 2012
Gloom, Despair and Agony
On this day in 1862,Governor Morton of Indiana presents his concerns over the aftermath from Perryville to President Lincoln. General McCook may not express his resentment from being left to face half of Bragg's army but the governor feels no such constraints, as many of the casualties were from Indiana volunteer regiments. Perryville, as Donelson and Shiloh before, had resulted in heavy numbers of Hoosier dead and wounded, the later of which are returning home in varying states of agony. With no immediate prospects of victory, their hearts are heavy and yet more sacrifice is to be asked of the people from the northwestern states.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0634
October 21, 1862 - 9.15 p. m.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT:
An officer just from Louisville announces that Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee, and that Buell's army is counter-marching to Lebanon. The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small portion of ours. Sufficient time was thus gained by the enemy to enable them to escape. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction. In the Northwest distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of the people.
O. P. MORTON,
Governor of Indiana.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0634
October 21, 1862 - 9.15 p. m.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT:
An officer just from Louisville announces that Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee, and that Buell's army is counter-marching to Lebanon. The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small portion of ours. Sufficient time was thus gained by the enemy to enable them to escape. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction. In the Northwest distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of the people.
O. P. MORTON,
Governor of Indiana.
Friday, October 19, 2012
I Say, I Say Again, Sir
In case General Don Carlos Buell was not sufficiently persuaded by his letter of the previous day, Halleck reiterates his instructions to push on toward either Knoxville or Chattanooga, with an endorsement by President and Commander-in-Chief Abraham Lincoln. It seems that the orders to live off the land also originate from the top of the chain of command. This plan can only work if Buell is is moving to intercept Bragg's army. If he follows Bragg, he will again find that the Confederate Army has consumed or destroyed any materiel available for forage.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0626
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 19, 1862 - 1.33 p. m.
Major-General BUEL, Mount Vernon, Ky.:
Your telegram of the 17th was received this morning, and has been laid before the President, who concurs in the views expressed in my telegram to you yesterday. The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy's resources; make it the heart of yours. Your army can line there if the enemy's can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper and levying contributions where necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while be no serious difficulty in reopening your communications with that place. He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals. Once hold the valley of the Upper Tennessee and the operations of guerrillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Perhaps the President is recalling the land of his youth, with bountiful farmlands tilled and maintained by the slaves and small farmers. Or possibly his opinion is informed by observations from the northern states, where the labor shortage has had only a small impact on agriculture. He obviously fails to appreciate the fact that, in Kentucky and Tennessee, there were few men available for sowing or reaping and the harvest, such as it was, has largely been consumed, destroyed or hidden from the marauding armies. In this part of the country, October of 1862 will not be remembered for it's Fall Festivals where local growers gathered to celebrate the abundance of their harvests.
General Buell has to weigh these instructions to march forward and live off the land with the reality on the ground. The following letter from Corps Commander T.L. Crittenden provides a substantial dose of reality, in case it was needed. By all accounts, the Confederate army is exhausted, demoralized and surviving on short rations. Is this the army Mr. Lincoln wants Buell to emulate?
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0628
HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
October 19, 1862 - 8.30 a. m.
[Major-General BUELL or THOMAS:]
GENERAL: I inclose you a note from General Smith, which gives all the information yet received from either of the brigades sent to the Richmond road. I am afraid Cruft came on the last of them and that Colonel Matthews will not see them. General Smith is convinced from information derived from a man who escaped from the rebels on the London road that they have fallen back to London. If so I have no hope of catching them. However, in obedience to orders, I send out a brigade this morning to press on in that direction. We cannot subsist our animals here and it looks like rain to-day. If it should rain and we don't succeed better than I dare hope in foraging we will, in my opinion, do ourselves more damage than we can do the enemy either by pursuing or remaining here. This is my opinion, but I am ready to do with alacrity whatever the general directs.My command will be out of provisions to-night.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. L. CRITTENDEN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0626
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 19, 1862 - 1.33 p. m.
Major-General BUEL, Mount Vernon, Ky.:
Your telegram of the 17th was received this morning, and has been laid before the President, who concurs in the views expressed in my telegram to you yesterday. The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy's resources; make it the heart of yours. Your army can line there if the enemy's can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper and levying contributions where necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while be no serious difficulty in reopening your communications with that place. He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals. Once hold the valley of the Upper Tennessee and the operations of guerrillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Perhaps the President is recalling the land of his youth, with bountiful farmlands tilled and maintained by the slaves and small farmers. Or possibly his opinion is informed by observations from the northern states, where the labor shortage has had only a small impact on agriculture. He obviously fails to appreciate the fact that, in Kentucky and Tennessee, there were few men available for sowing or reaping and the harvest, such as it was, has largely been consumed, destroyed or hidden from the marauding armies. In this part of the country, October of 1862 will not be remembered for it's Fall Festivals where local growers gathered to celebrate the abundance of their harvests.
General Buell has to weigh these instructions to march forward and live off the land with the reality on the ground. The following letter from Corps Commander T.L. Crittenden provides a substantial dose of reality, in case it was needed. By all accounts, the Confederate army is exhausted, demoralized and surviving on short rations. Is this the army Mr. Lincoln wants Buell to emulate?
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0628
HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
October 19, 1862 - 8.30 a. m.
[Major-General BUELL or THOMAS:]
GENERAL: I inclose you a note from General Smith, which gives all the information yet received from either of the brigades sent to the Richmond road. I am afraid Cruft came on the last of them and that Colonel Matthews will not see them. General Smith is convinced from information derived from a man who escaped from the rebels on the London road that they have fallen back to London. If so I have no hope of catching them. However, in obedience to orders, I send out a brigade this morning to press on in that direction. We cannot subsist our animals here and it looks like rain to-day. If it should rain and we don't succeed better than I dare hope in foraging we will, in my opinion, do ourselves more damage than we can do the enemy either by pursuing or remaining here. This is my opinion, but I am ready to do with alacrity whatever the general directs.My command will be out of provisions to-night.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. L. CRITTENDEN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Thursday, October 18, 2012
Ixnay on Ashvillenay
This letter from General Halleck offers Buell some support and agrees that gaining control of East Tennessee is of prime importance. Buell's plan to fall back to Nashville, however, is not considered an adequate measure toward this end.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0623
Washington, October 18, 1862 - 3.50 a. m.
Major General D. C. BUELL,
Crab Orchard, via Louisville, Ky.:
The rapid march of your army from Louisville and your victory at Perryville has given great satisfaction to the Government. The great object to be attained is to drive the enemy from Kentucky and East Tennessee. If we cannot do it now we need never to hope of it. If the country is such that you cannot follow the enemy, is there not some other practicable road that will lead to the same time result - that is, compel him to leave the country? By keeping between him and Nashville can you not cover that place and at the same time compel him to fall back into the valley of Virginia or into Georgia? If we can occupy Knoxville or Chattanooga we can keep the enemy out of Tennessee and Kentucky. To fall back on Nashville is to give up East Tennessee to be plundered. Moreover, you are now much nearer to Knoxville and as near to Chattanooga as to Nashville. If you go to the latter place and then to East Tennessee, you move over two sides of an equilateral triangle, while the enemy holds the third. Again, may he not in the mean time make another raid into Kentucky? If Nashville is really in danger, it must be re-enforced. Morgan's forces have been sent to Western Virginia, but we probably can very soon send some troops up the Cumberland. Those intended for that purpose have been drawn off by the urgent appeals of General Grant and Curtis. Cannot some of the forces at Louisville be sent to Nashville?
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Meanwhile, this brief communique from the office in Cincinnatti provides a summary of the situation in Kentucky on this day in 1862.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0625
CINCINNATI, OHIO, October 18, 1862 - 10 p. m.
T. T. ECKERT:
Morgan with 1,500 guerrillas made raid on Lexington this morning. Met by Home Guards - 300 Federals. Engagement short and brisk. Morgan holds place. Weight's army not at Lexington yet. Bragg still running. Reached Mount Vernon a day or two since. Road to Gap obstructed by trees, &c. Bragg obliged to abandon it an go via Somerset. Crittenden close after him, followed by McCook. Hundreds of rebels falling by the way form exhaustion. Federals picking up large numbers of stragglers. Gilbert at Crab Orchard at last accounts. Office opened at Buell's headquarters, 7 miles from Crab Orchard, this evening.
A. STAGER.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0623
Washington, October 18, 1862 - 3.50 a. m.
Major General D. C. BUELL,
Crab Orchard, via Louisville, Ky.:
The rapid march of your army from Louisville and your victory at Perryville has given great satisfaction to the Government. The great object to be attained is to drive the enemy from Kentucky and East Tennessee. If we cannot do it now we need never to hope of it. If the country is such that you cannot follow the enemy, is there not some other practicable road that will lead to the same time result - that is, compel him to leave the country? By keeping between him and Nashville can you not cover that place and at the same time compel him to fall back into the valley of Virginia or into Georgia? If we can occupy Knoxville or Chattanooga we can keep the enemy out of Tennessee and Kentucky. To fall back on Nashville is to give up East Tennessee to be plundered. Moreover, you are now much nearer to Knoxville and as near to Chattanooga as to Nashville. If you go to the latter place and then to East Tennessee, you move over two sides of an equilateral triangle, while the enemy holds the third. Again, may he not in the mean time make another raid into Kentucky? If Nashville is really in danger, it must be re-enforced. Morgan's forces have been sent to Western Virginia, but we probably can very soon send some troops up the Cumberland. Those intended for that purpose have been drawn off by the urgent appeals of General Grant and Curtis. Cannot some of the forces at Louisville be sent to Nashville?
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
Meanwhile, this brief communique from the office in Cincinnatti provides a summary of the situation in Kentucky on this day in 1862.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0625
CINCINNATI, OHIO, October 18, 1862 - 10 p. m.
T. T. ECKERT:
Morgan with 1,500 guerrillas made raid on Lexington this morning. Met by Home Guards - 300 Federals. Engagement short and brisk. Morgan holds place. Weight's army not at Lexington yet. Bragg still running. Reached Mount Vernon a day or two since. Road to Gap obstructed by trees, &c. Bragg obliged to abandon it an go via Somerset. Crittenden close after him, followed by McCook. Hundreds of rebels falling by the way form exhaustion. Federals picking up large numbers of stragglers. Gilbert at Crab Orchard at last accounts. Office opened at Buell's headquarters, 7 miles from Crab Orchard, this evening.
A. STAGER.
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Buell's Eye Now on Nashville
Following yesterday's discouraging report, Buell further explains the futility of his infantry's pursuing Bragg's wagons and cavalry. His army has covered more territory on foot than any comparable force, having marched from Nashville to Louisville and now as far as Mount Vernon, Kentucky, covering nearly 300 miles in about one month. (Keep in mind that his army had been scattered from Nashville to Florence, Alabama when the orders to move to Kentucky were issued.) He plans to return to Nashville and then proposes taking east Tennessee with a reinforced version of the same army he withdrew through Nashville, leaving the rest to guard Kentucky under the command of General Wright.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0621
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Camp near Mount Vernon, Ky., October 17, 1862.
(Received October 19.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
My advance has continued to follow up the retreat of the enemy, but the progress has been slow, owing more to the obstructions places in the road yesterday and to-day by felling tress than to the opposition, though more or less skirmishing has been kept up. The absence of forage has compelled me to keep back the greater part of the cavalry and artillery and depend mainly on infantry. It is possible that we may be able to strike the enemy's trains and rear guard coming in on the Richmond road, but not much more, and if he gets beyond London without that it will be useless to continue the pursuit; and, as I advised you last night, I shall direct my main force by the most direct route upon Nashville, where its presence will certainly be required, whether for offensive or defensive objects. I propose to take the old divisions which I brought out of Tennessee, to each brigade of which I have added a new regiment, and one other (Sheridan's), composed about two-thirds of new regiments. Kentucky should not, under the present condition of things, be left with less than 30,000 men to guard communications and repel raids. I propose for the present to place one brigade at Lebanon, one at Munfordville, one division at Bowling Green, besides the necessary bridge guards at various points. General Wright has, I believe, moved one division to Lexington. That force should be kept there, or, better still - as long as the roads are in condition so that it can be supplied - should be thrown forward to London. There should be two regiments of cavalry at Lexington, two at Bowling Green, and two at Lebanon. They should be employed actively against guerrilla bands and concentrate rapidly against more formidable cavalry raids. There can, however, be no perfect security for Kentucky until East Tennessee is occupied. There has been no time hitherto when that could be done with any prospect of permanency. With the force that was available we should have marched into the very heart of the enemy's resources and away from our own, just as Bragg did in invading Kentucky, and with any means that we have hitherto had the result must have been similar. The enemy will regard the invasion of East Tennessee as the most dangerous blow at the rebellion, and will, it seems to me, turn his greatest efforts against it, limiting his operations in Virginia if necessary to the defense of Richmond. From this our estimate can be formed of the force with which it should be undertaken or at least followed up.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0621
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Camp near Mount Vernon, Ky., October 17, 1862.
(Received October 19.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
My advance has continued to follow up the retreat of the enemy, but the progress has been slow, owing more to the obstructions places in the road yesterday and to-day by felling tress than to the opposition, though more or less skirmishing has been kept up. The absence of forage has compelled me to keep back the greater part of the cavalry and artillery and depend mainly on infantry. It is possible that we may be able to strike the enemy's trains and rear guard coming in on the Richmond road, but not much more, and if he gets beyond London without that it will be useless to continue the pursuit; and, as I advised you last night, I shall direct my main force by the most direct route upon Nashville, where its presence will certainly be required, whether for offensive or defensive objects. I propose to take the old divisions which I brought out of Tennessee, to each brigade of which I have added a new regiment, and one other (Sheridan's), composed about two-thirds of new regiments. Kentucky should not, under the present condition of things, be left with less than 30,000 men to guard communications and repel raids. I propose for the present to place one brigade at Lebanon, one at Munfordville, one division at Bowling Green, besides the necessary bridge guards at various points. General Wright has, I believe, moved one division to Lexington. That force should be kept there, or, better still - as long as the roads are in condition so that it can be supplied - should be thrown forward to London. There should be two regiments of cavalry at Lexington, two at Bowling Green, and two at Lebanon. They should be employed actively against guerrilla bands and concentrate rapidly against more formidable cavalry raids. There can, however, be no perfect security for Kentucky until East Tennessee is occupied. There has been no time hitherto when that could be done with any prospect of permanency. With the force that was available we should have marched into the very heart of the enemy's resources and away from our own, just as Bragg did in invading Kentucky, and with any means that we have hitherto had the result must have been similar. The enemy will regard the invasion of East Tennessee as the most dangerous blow at the rebellion, and will, it seems to me, turn his greatest efforts against it, limiting his operations in Virginia if necessary to the defense of Richmond. From this our estimate can be formed of the force with which it should be undertaken or at least followed up.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
Buell's Eye View
On this, the 16th day of October, 1862, Buell sends the following assessment of his army's predicament to General Halleck in Washington. The normally clear headed general seems to be rambling a bit, probably showing the effects of exhaustion. If Halleck was looking for a sign that General Buell needed to be replaced, this letter certainly provided it. His claim that his entire army, including new recruits, defeated Bragg when only McCook's Corps was seriously engaged is either misleading or it reflects a profound misunderstanding of the events at Perryville.
The other possibility is that this attribution reflects the old school general's approach to battle, simply moving units around on a map until the enemy decides to leave. This was a lesson taught by Halleck himself and demonstrated at Corinth. That performance had earned Halleck a promotion only four months earlier, but such results were no longer acceptable in the ever-changing landscape of the Civil War. The need was growing for generals that could find, attack and capture or kill the enemy. It had become clear that the highly organized and methodical Buell did not meet these job requirements.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0619
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
October 16, 1862. (Received October 17.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
You are aware that between Crab Orchard and Cumberland Gap the country is almost a desert. The limited supply of forage which the country affords is consumed by the enemy as he passes. In the day and a half that we have been in this sterile region our animals have suffered exceedingly. The enemy has been driven into the heart of this desert and must go on, for he cannot exist in it. For the same reason we cannot pursue in it with any hope of overtaking him, for while he is moving back on his supplies and as he goes consuming what the country affords we must bring ours forward. There is but one road and that a bad one. The route abounds in difficult defiles, in which a small force can retard the progress of a large one for a considerable time, and in that time the enemy could gain material advantage in a move upon other points. For these reasons, which I do not think it necessary to elaborate, I deem it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit, but propose to direct he main force under my command rapidly upon Nashville, which General Negley reported to me as already being invested by a considerable force and toward which I have no doubt Bragg will move the main part of his army. The railroads are being rapidly repaired and will soon be available for our supplies. In the mean time I shall throw myself on my wagon transportation, which, fortunately, is ample. While I shall proceed with these dispositions, deeming them to be proper for the public interest, it is but meet that I should say that the present time is perhaps as convenient as any for making any changes that may be thought proper in the command of this army. It has not accomplished all that I had hoped or all that faction might demand; yet, composed as it is, one-half of perfectly new troops, it has defeated a powerful and thoroughly disciplined army in one battle and has driven it away baffled and dispirited at least, and as much demoralized as an army can be under such discipline as Bragg maintains over all troops that he commands. I will telegraph you more in detail in regard to the disposition of troops in Kentucky and other matters to-morrow.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
The other possibility is that this attribution reflects the old school general's approach to battle, simply moving units around on a map until the enemy decides to leave. This was a lesson taught by Halleck himself and demonstrated at Corinth. That performance had earned Halleck a promotion only four months earlier, but such results were no longer acceptable in the ever-changing landscape of the Civil War. The need was growing for generals that could find, attack and capture or kill the enemy. It had become clear that the highly organized and methodical Buell did not meet these job requirements.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0619
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
October 16, 1862. (Received October 17.)
Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
You are aware that between Crab Orchard and Cumberland Gap the country is almost a desert. The limited supply of forage which the country affords is consumed by the enemy as he passes. In the day and a half that we have been in this sterile region our animals have suffered exceedingly. The enemy has been driven into the heart of this desert and must go on, for he cannot exist in it. For the same reason we cannot pursue in it with any hope of overtaking him, for while he is moving back on his supplies and as he goes consuming what the country affords we must bring ours forward. There is but one road and that a bad one. The route abounds in difficult defiles, in which a small force can retard the progress of a large one for a considerable time, and in that time the enemy could gain material advantage in a move upon other points. For these reasons, which I do not think it necessary to elaborate, I deem it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit, but propose to direct he main force under my command rapidly upon Nashville, which General Negley reported to me as already being invested by a considerable force and toward which I have no doubt Bragg will move the main part of his army. The railroads are being rapidly repaired and will soon be available for our supplies. In the mean time I shall throw myself on my wagon transportation, which, fortunately, is ample. While I shall proceed with these dispositions, deeming them to be proper for the public interest, it is but meet that I should say that the present time is perhaps as convenient as any for making any changes that may be thought proper in the command of this army. It has not accomplished all that I had hoped or all that faction might demand; yet, composed as it is, one-half of perfectly new troops, it has defeated a powerful and thoroughly disciplined army in one battle and has driven it away baffled and dispirited at least, and as much demoralized as an army can be under such discipline as Bragg maintains over all troops that he commands. I will telegraph you more in detail in regard to the disposition of troops in Kentucky and other matters to-morrow.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Monday, October 15, 2012
Full Frontal Futility
The following report from Col. Edward M. McCook, first cousin of General Alexander McCook provides an accurate account of the retreat of the Confederate Army. In situations like this, cavalry were primarily used for scouting and engaging the fleeing enemy. The Colonel's formal education is revealed in his use of the French "Corps d'Armee" when referring to the newly adopted Federal Corps Command structure. For a review of this famous family from Ohio (via Pennsylvania) , see Wikipedia's page on Fighting McCooks .
The subsequent communications surviving from this day in 1862 are presented to illustrate the physical condition of Buell's Army as they pursued a fleeing Bragg who had adopted a scorched earth policy. The three days' rations carried by each soldier have run out and there is no forage materiel to be found. Once again, following the War Department's theory that the army's movement is hindered by an abundance of transportation has brought troop movement to a screeching halt. For this failure, Buell would be given the credit in his Court of Inquiry.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0618
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
October [15], 1862.
Major-General CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Second Corps d'Armee:
GENERAL: The enemy have undoubtedly left Lancester. They were passing through all last night; commenced to move yesterday evening, and their rear was still moving this evening. They are going in the direction of Crab Orchard. Both bridges over Hanging Fork were burned by them this afternoon. One regiment of my brigade (Colonel Wolford's) had a skirmish with them to-day on the Lancaster road, repulsing their cavalry and killing and wounding about 30. The Second Indiana also had a skirmish with them on the Dick Robinson road and drove them back.The information concerning their passing through Lancaster all last night is confirmed by the statements of 20 or 30 citizens who came to our lines on the road and I think cannot be doubtful.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD M. McCOOK,Colonel,
Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.
* * *
CRAWFORD STATION, October 15, 1862.
Colonel J. B. FRY, Chief of Staff:
Inclosed please find General Van Cleve's report.
The general desires a fresh division sent forward in time to reach Mount Vernon by daylight, as General Van Cleve's division is completely worn-out and will have to draw rations before marching.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. FLYNT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
(It is assumed that the above request to send a fresh division forward in time so that they could reach the city of Mount Vernon, Ky by midnight is a miss-reading of the above letter, but it is likely the only way Buell could have caught up with Bragg, at this point.)
* * *
If one of McCook's divisions cannot be sent forward the general will send forward Smith's.
* * *
OCTOBER 15, 1862 - 10 p. m.
General THOMAS, Second in Command:
GENERAL: Let the Second Corps push ahead after the enemy at the earliest hour practicable in the morning. The other corps can make no progress, as the road is so crowded, and they will not therefore march to-morrow unless it becomes necessary. If it is possible to collect forage at Mount Vernon have it done. Brigade will move direct to Mount Vernon. The supply trains are being hurried forward.Division commanders should send to Captain Chandler, chief quartermaster, and get supplies if needed.Issues must be made so as to give the men three days in haversacks. Captain Williams, McCook's commissary, is prepared to turn over some rations to Wood's division.
Respectfully, &c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
The subsequent communications surviving from this day in 1862 are presented to illustrate the physical condition of Buell's Army as they pursued a fleeing Bragg who had adopted a scorched earth policy. The three days' rations carried by each soldier have run out and there is no forage materiel to be found. Once again, following the War Department's theory that the army's movement is hindered by an abundance of transportation has brought troop movement to a screeching halt. For this failure, Buell would be given the credit in his Court of Inquiry.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0618
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,
October [15], 1862.
Major-General CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Second Corps d'Armee:
GENERAL: The enemy have undoubtedly left Lancester. They were passing through all last night; commenced to move yesterday evening, and their rear was still moving this evening. They are going in the direction of Crab Orchard. Both bridges over Hanging Fork were burned by them this afternoon. One regiment of my brigade (Colonel Wolford's) had a skirmish with them to-day on the Lancaster road, repulsing their cavalry and killing and wounding about 30. The Second Indiana also had a skirmish with them on the Dick Robinson road and drove them back.The information concerning their passing through Lancaster all last night is confirmed by the statements of 20 or 30 citizens who came to our lines on the road and I think cannot be doubtful.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD M. McCOOK,Colonel,
Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.
* * *
CRAWFORD STATION, October 15, 1862.
Colonel J. B. FRY, Chief of Staff:
Inclosed please find General Van Cleve's report.
The general desires a fresh division sent forward in time to reach Mount Vernon by daylight, as General Van Cleve's division is completely worn-out and will have to draw rations before marching.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. FLYNT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
(It is assumed that the above request to send a fresh division forward in time so that they could reach the city of Mount Vernon, Ky by midnight is a miss-reading of the above letter, but it is likely the only way Buell could have caught up with Bragg, at this point.)
* * *
If one of McCook's divisions cannot be sent forward the general will send forward Smith's.
* * *
OCTOBER 15, 1862 - 10 p. m.
General THOMAS, Second in Command:
GENERAL: Let the Second Corps push ahead after the enemy at the earliest hour practicable in the morning. The other corps can make no progress, as the road is so crowded, and they will not therefore march to-morrow unless it becomes necessary. If it is possible to collect forage at Mount Vernon have it done. Brigade will move direct to Mount Vernon. The supply trains are being hurried forward.Division commanders should send to Captain Chandler, chief quartermaster, and get supplies if needed.Issues must be made so as to give the men three days in haversacks. Captain Williams, McCook's commissary, is prepared to turn over some rations to Wood's division.
Respectfully, &c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
Sunday, October 14, 2012
Forward!
McCook's First Corps, having left their dead on the field at Perryville to be collected by others, are given no slack in Buell's pursuit of Bragg along with the corps of Gilbert and Thomas. One wonders at the resentment that might be expressed if McCook's Corps is to share the road with Gilbert's, who had sat by idly while McCook was fighting off Bragg's army on October 8th, just six days' prior.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0616
OCTOBER 14, 1862.
General McCOOK, Commanding First Corps:
GENERAL: March your corps at once for Stanford and follow on after the Second Corps. If Smith's division of the Second Corps has not marched it must giver up its place and fall in behind you.
Respectfully,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
P. S. - Don't delay the march of Gillbert's corps. The columns can move side by side for the short distance through down where they are on the same road.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0616
OCTOBER 14, 1862.
General McCOOK, Commanding First Corps:
GENERAL: March your corps at once for Stanford and follow on after the Second Corps. If Smith's division of the Second Corps has not marched it must giver up its place and fall in behind you.
Respectfully,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
P. S. - Don't delay the march of Gillbert's corps. The columns can move side by side for the short distance through down where they are on the same road.
Saturday, October 13, 2012
Buell 's Report to Halleck
On this evening, four and one-half days after Bragg's assault on McCook's First Corps, Buell's plan to follow the retreating rebels is complete. He sends the following update to General Halleck in Washington.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0611
DANVILLE, KY., October 13, 1862 - 10.30 p.m .
(Received October 14, 1.35 a. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
Information received since my arrival here to-night leaves little room to doubt that the enemy is in retreat toward Crab Orchard - in fact that he commenced passing through Lancaster at 1 o'clock last night. My advance will march at 12 o'clock to-night. The enemy will, I think, divide his force at Crab Orchard, Bragg striking for Nashville by the way of Somerset and Smith going through Cumberland Gap. I shall direct the pursuit mainly against Bragg. The troops which Wright will have will be ample security against any attempt of Smith to return. General Negley, who is in command at Nashville, reports that the enemy had invested him in considerable strength and summoned him to surrender, which he promptly declined, and expressed himself confident of being able to hold out. But that force may be increased so as to endanger him. His supplies are also growing scant. I would advise that General Morgan be at once dispatched with the Cumberland Gap force by rail to Louisville and thence to Nashville in charge of a supply train. The railroad, with the protection which this movement would give, can be opened to within about 30 miles of Nashville in two weeks and all the way through in two more days.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Now in posession of reliable inteligence that Bragg & Smith are in full retreat and burning their bridges behind them, Buell sends the corps of Thomas and McCook to follow, with no apparent designs to interrupt the enemy's retreat. The Seventeenth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry remains in Starkweather's Brigade, Rousseau's Division of McCook's First Corps.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0612
OCTOBER 13, 1862 - 11 p. m.
General McCOOK:
March punctually at 6 in the morning via Danville and Stanford; take three days' rations in haversacks, and let the ambulances and one ammunition wagon to a regiment accompany the troops. All other wagons to follow after the entire army. Crittenden's corps is in advance of you; the trains must move in the same order. Gilbert's corps moves over the Lancaster road. The enemy is retiring by Crab Orchard. Detail one of your raw brigades and four pieces of artillery to guard the entire train.
Respectfully,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
P. S. - We wish to reach Crab Orchard to-morrow night. Let two of the regiments detailed for the train and two pieces of artillery come to Danville and take position with Gay's cavalry to guard until the entire train passes and then to follow on after it.
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0611
DANVILLE, KY., October 13, 1862 - 10.30 p.m .
(Received October 14, 1.35 a. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
Information received since my arrival here to-night leaves little room to doubt that the enemy is in retreat toward Crab Orchard - in fact that he commenced passing through Lancaster at 1 o'clock last night. My advance will march at 12 o'clock to-night. The enemy will, I think, divide his force at Crab Orchard, Bragg striking for Nashville by the way of Somerset and Smith going through Cumberland Gap. I shall direct the pursuit mainly against Bragg. The troops which Wright will have will be ample security against any attempt of Smith to return. General Negley, who is in command at Nashville, reports that the enemy had invested him in considerable strength and summoned him to surrender, which he promptly declined, and expressed himself confident of being able to hold out. But that force may be increased so as to endanger him. His supplies are also growing scant. I would advise that General Morgan be at once dispatched with the Cumberland Gap force by rail to Louisville and thence to Nashville in charge of a supply train. The railroad, with the protection which this movement would give, can be opened to within about 30 miles of Nashville in two weeks and all the way through in two more days.
D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.
Now in posession of reliable inteligence that Bragg & Smith are in full retreat and burning their bridges behind them, Buell sends the corps of Thomas and McCook to follow, with no apparent designs to interrupt the enemy's retreat. The Seventeenth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry remains in Starkweather's Brigade, Rousseau's Division of McCook's First Corps.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0612
OCTOBER 13, 1862 - 11 p. m.
General McCOOK:
March punctually at 6 in the morning via Danville and Stanford; take three days' rations in haversacks, and let the ambulances and one ammunition wagon to a regiment accompany the troops. All other wagons to follow after the entire army. Crittenden's corps is in advance of you; the trains must move in the same order. Gilbert's corps moves over the Lancaster road. The enemy is retiring by Crab Orchard. Detail one of your raw brigades and four pieces of artillery to guard the entire train.
Respectfully,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
P. S. - We wish to reach Crab Orchard to-morrow night. Let two of the regiments detailed for the train and two pieces of artillery come to Danville and take position with Gay's cavalry to guard until the entire train passes and then to follow on after it.
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel.
Friday, October 12, 2012
Boyle's Reply to Lincoln
In the absence of news from Buell, General Boyle provides the following summary of accumulated information when the president reiterates his anxiety over Buell's Pursuit of Bragg, on this day in 1862.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0608
WAR DEPARTMENT,
October 12, 1862 - 4.10 p. m.
General BOYLE,
We are very anxious to hear from General Buell's army. We have heard nothing since day before yesterday. Have you anything?
A. LINCOLN.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu/edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content+023/0609
HEADQUARTERS,
Louisville, October 12, 1862 - 5.30 p. m.
President LINCOLN:
Your dispatch received. Have no reliable information since 10th instant. Battle was fought on Wednesday by two divisions of McCook's corps, and most of rebel force, under Hardee and Polk, Bragg commanding the whole. We lost Generals Jackson and Terrill, Colonel Webster, Lieutenant-Colonel Jouett, Major Campbell. Colonel Lytle, of Ohio, wounded in leading bayonet charge, and is believed to be in hands of enemy. Our loss estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 killed and wounded. The enemy's loss as great, and believe to be greater. Bragg and Cheatham reported killed, but needs confirmation. Doctor Murray, medical director of Buell's army, telegraphed this morning for hospital accommodations for 1,000 wounded being sent back from the battle. My understanding is that Buell is pressing the enemy. Heavy fighting reported at Harrodsburg. Expect to receive news by courier to night. Will send it to you.
J. T. BOYLE,
Brigadier-General.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0608
WAR DEPARTMENT,
October 12, 1862 - 4.10 p. m.
General BOYLE,
We are very anxious to hear from General Buell's army. We have heard nothing since day before yesterday. Have you anything?
A. LINCOLN.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu/edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content+023/0609
HEADQUARTERS,
Louisville, October 12, 1862 - 5.30 p. m.
President LINCOLN:
Your dispatch received. Have no reliable information since 10th instant. Battle was fought on Wednesday by two divisions of McCook's corps, and most of rebel force, under Hardee and Polk, Bragg commanding the whole. We lost Generals Jackson and Terrill, Colonel Webster, Lieutenant-Colonel Jouett, Major Campbell. Colonel Lytle, of Ohio, wounded in leading bayonet charge, and is believed to be in hands of enemy. Our loss estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 killed and wounded. The enemy's loss as great, and believe to be greater. Bragg and Cheatham reported killed, but needs confirmation. Doctor Murray, medical director of Buell's army, telegraphed this morning for hospital accommodations for 1,000 wounded being sent back from the battle. My understanding is that Buell is pressing the enemy. Heavy fighting reported at Harrodsburg. Expect to receive news by courier to night. Will send it to you.
J. T. BOYLE,
Brigadier-General.
Thursday, October 11, 2012
Lincoln Inquires
On this day in 1862, President Lincoln inquires of General Boyle at Louisville as to the particulars of General Don Carlos Buell's long-anticipated hot pursuit of the enemy from the field at Perryville. He will be disappointed when he finds that Buell is conducting this chase by dispatching couriers from his headquarters, two and a half miles west of Perryville, and seems to be content with sending scouts to document the retreat, then occupying the abandoned ground.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0606
OCTOBER 11, 1862.]
General THOMAS:
Push one division, or whatever force further information may indicate to be necessary, across to the ford of Dick's river and put the rest of General Crittenden's corps across to the Harrodsburg and Danville road, so as to be in supporting distance if required. I understand the character of the country is such that you can move without regard to the roads until you get near Dick's River, when you will have to keep somewhat up toward Harrodsburg. Gilbert will follow and stop to-night at your present camp.
Let me know what you do. I will be here to-night.
D. C. BUELL.
* * *
WAR DEPARTMENT, October 11, 1862 - 4 p. m.
General BOYLE, Louisville, KY.:
Please send any news you have from General Buell to-day.
A. LINCOLN.
Boyle might have been tempted to reply that General Buell was resting comfortably, since there was essentially no activity to report.
Ref.: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=023/0606
OCTOBER 11, 1862.]
General THOMAS:
Push one division, or whatever force further information may indicate to be necessary, across to the ford of Dick's river and put the rest of General Crittenden's corps across to the Harrodsburg and Danville road, so as to be in supporting distance if required. I understand the character of the country is such that you can move without regard to the roads until you get near Dick's River, when you will have to keep somewhat up toward Harrodsburg. Gilbert will follow and stop to-night at your present camp.
Let me know what you do. I will be here to-night.
D. C. BUELL.
* * *
WAR DEPARTMENT, October 11, 1862 - 4 p. m.
General BOYLE, Louisville, KY.:
Please send any news you have from General Buell to-day.
A. LINCOLN.
Boyle might have been tempted to reply that General Buell was resting comfortably, since there was essentially no activity to report.
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